Dretske's informational semantics grounds intentional content in reliable causal covariation with environmental features, requiring no intersubjective confirmation from minded others.

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Dretske: Fred Dretske is an American philosopher known for his work on knowledge, perception, and information theory. He developed influential ideas about how we gain knowledge through our senses and what it means to truly "know" something, arguing that knowledge requires being appropriately connected to the facts in the world. His work has significantly shaped modern debates about consciousness, mental content, and how our minds represent reality.
Environmental features(as used in perception philosophy): Specific things or qualities in the world around us that we can sense or interact with, like colors, sounds, or textures.
Informational semantics(as Dretske's main philosophical theory): A theory that says our thoughts and perceptions mean something because they're reliably connected to things in the real world—like how smoke means fire because smoke is always caused by fire.
Intentional content(Rey 2006: 242): Whatever we understand x to be when we use the idiom 'representation of x' but there is no real x

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