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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Dutch book and representation theorem arguments provide a... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    Dutch book and representation theorem arguments provide at best a pragmatic, not epistemic, justification for obeying the probability axioms

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Dutch book arguments show that deviating from probability axioms leads to irrational choices
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    • 2.Showing that a norm avoids irrational choices establishes pragmatic rationality, not epistemic rationality
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Epistemic rationality and practical rationality are not cleanly separable when beliefs are the very inputs that determine action outcomes.
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    • 2.A Dutch book exploits incoherent credences directly, meaning the vulnerability is cognitive, not merely behavioral.
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    • 3.If the revealed irrationality is located in the belief state itself, the argument's force is epistemic, not merely pragmatic.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Representation theorems (e.g., Ramsey, Savage) derive probability from preference orderings satisfying rationality axioms, grounding probability in norms of consistent preference.
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    • 2.Consistency norms for preferences are widely accepted as constitutive of rationality in both epistemic and practical domains, not purely prudential ones.
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    • 3.Therefore, representation theorems provide a rationality-constitutive, not merely pragmatic, justification for probabilism.
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    Related

    A Dutch book exploits incoherent credences directly, meaning the vulnerability i...Consistency norms for preferences are widely accepted as constitutive of rationa...Dutch book arguments show that deviating from probability axioms leads to irrati...Epistemic rationality and practical rationality are not cleanly separable when b...
    +4 moreShow less
    If the revealed irrationality is located in the belief state itself, the argumen...Representation theorems (e.g., Ramsey, Savage) derive probability from preferenc...Showing that a norm avoids irrational choices establishes pragmatic rationality,...Therefore, representation theorems provide a rationality-constitutive, not merel...

    Similar

    Dutch book arguments show that deviating from probability axioms leads...79%The pragmatic Dutch Book argument is less convincing as a justificatio...74%The Bayes-Laplace argument relies on the rules of the probability calc...74%Analogical reasoning can be directed primarily toward prior probabilit...73%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: formal-epistemology
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    Recently, a different sort of justification has been gaining favor, one that may extend to the PoI. Arguments that rely on Dutch book or representation theorems have long been suspect because of their pragmatic character. They aim to show that deviating from the probability axioms leads to irrational choices, which seems to show at best that obeying the probability axioms is part of pragmatic rationality, as opposed to epistemic irrationality. (But see Christensen (1996, 2001) and Vineberg (1997
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit