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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Edgington's knowability principle (EKP) is not general enough as an epistemic constraint on truth

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The actuality operator rigidly designates actual situations, so the truth-value of statements of the form 'Actually p' does not vary across possible situations
      ?

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    • 2.If 'Actually p' is true, then it is necessary that 'Actually p' is true
      ?

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    • 3.Anyone likely to endorse the knowability principle would expect it to hold of all truths, not merely necessary truths involving the actuality operator
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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