Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    EKP fails to specify an epistemic constraint on contingen... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→Edgington's knowability principle (EKP) is not general enough as an epistemic constraint on truth

    EKP fails to specify an epistemic constraint on contingent truth

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Modality & Possibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Anyone likely to endorse the knowability principle would expect it to hold of al...Edgington's knowability principle (EKP) is not general enough as an epistemic co...If 'Actually p' is true, then it is necessary that 'Actually p' is trueThe actuality operator rigidly designates actual situations, so the truth-value ...

    Similar

    A contingent truth cannot explain or ground a necessary truth without ...83%A logic that allows no evidence against a contingent statement fails t...82%Inductive logic should not presuppose the truth of contingent statemen...81%Every contingent truth has a sufficient reason81%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: fitch-paradox
    View source passageHide passage
    Since the actuality operator rigidly designates actual situations, the truth-value of statements of the form \(\A p\) will not vary across possible situations. ‘\(\A p\)’ entails ‘in every situation \(\A p\)’. Thus, as Edgington is aware, if \(\A p\) then it is necessary that \(\A p\). This by itself poses a problem for EKP. The criticism is that Edgington’s approach is not general enough. Anyone who is likely to endorse the knowability principle is likely to think that it holds of all truths, n

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective