Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Eliminative materialism holds that folk psychology is a r... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→There may be no psychological natural kinds corresponding to folk psychological concepts such as belief and desire

    Eliminative materialism holds that folk psychology is a radically false theory whose ontology will not survive mature neuroscientific revision (Paul Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism,' 1981).

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Key Terms

    Neuroscientific revision(what might disprove folk psychology concepts)
    Changes and improvements to our understanding of the brain and how it works as science learns more about it.
    Ontology(Carnap argues this enterprise is based on a mistake)
    The philosophical discipline that tries to answer hard questions about what there really is.
    Paul Churchland(the source of this philosophical position)
    A contemporary American philosopher famous for arguing that our ordinary mental concepts (like 'belief' and 'desire') don't actually refer to real things and will eventually be replaced by better neuroscientific explanations.
    eliminative materialism(philosophy of mind)
    The view that folk psychological states (such as beliefs and propositional memories) do not exist because nothing in a successful scientific account of cognition shares the central properties attributed to those states

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Explore a random proposition
    Start fresh with something unrelated.
    folk psychology(Lewis 1972)
    The body of common sense platitudes containing psychological terms such as 'sensation', 'perceive', 'belief', 'desire', and 'emotion', as well as perceptual terms for colors, smells, sounds, and tastes

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    There may be no psychological natural kinds corresponding to folk psychological ...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective