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It is not the case that Eliminative materialists like Churchland argue that 'thinking' as a folk-psychological category may not correspond to any real natural kind.
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1.
Even if 'thinking' has no unified neural substrate, it may pick out a real functional property that systematically explains and predicts behavior.
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2.
The absence of a single boundary doesn't eliminate a kind—species, weather systems, and diseases lack sharp definitions yet remain scientifically legitimate.
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3.
Eliminativism conflates 'folk concepts are imprecise' with 'the phenomenon itself doesn't exist,' but imprecision allows conceptual refinement, not elimination.
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Reasons Against
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1.
Folk psychology uses 'thinking' inconsistently across contexts, suggesting it lacks the unified reference required of natural kinds.
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2.
Neuroscience reveals no unified brain mechanism corresponding to folk 'thinking'—only diverse, distributed processes without natural boundaries.
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3.
Historical precedent shows folk categories (phlogiston, vital essence) were eliminated when science matured, suggesting 'thinking' may follow suit.
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