Eliminativist and illusionist positions (Dennett, Frankish) dissolve the explanatory gap by reconceiving phenomenal consciousness itself, removing the target the argument assumes is irreducible.

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Reasons For

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Reason for

1.If phenomenal consciousness is a folk-psychological construct rather than a natural kind, reconceiving it dissolves pseudo-problems based on confused categories.
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2.The explanatory gap persists only because we assume introspective appearances reveal consciousness's true nature; revising that assumption resolves the impasse.
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3.Successful scientific ontology routinely eliminates entities (phlogiston, vital forces) posited by earlier frameworks; consciousness may follow this pattern.
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Reasons Against

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Reason against

1.Reconceiving consciousness doesn't explain the explanandum; it merely stipulates it away, leaving the hard problem of why experience seems irreducibly subjective.
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2.Our direct access to phenomenal properties gives them evidential authority that conceptual revision alone cannot override without begging the question against realism.
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3.Eliminativism must explain what actually exists in place of consciousness; denying the phenomenon without positive replacement is metaphysically incomplete.
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Key Terms

Dennett, Daniel(as the creator of the intentional-stance framework): A contemporary American philosopher who studies the mind and consciousness, known for arguing that we can understand how brains work by treating them as if they have beliefs and desires, even without knowing all the details of how neurons fire.
Frankish, Keith(cited as a proponent of illusionism): A contemporary philosopher who defends illusionism, the idea that our sense of having irreducible consciousness is itself an illusion.
eliminativism(Lewis was an eliminativist about religion, contrasting with his compatibilism in other domains): The position that the entities or concepts in question do not exist or should be rejected from one's ontology
explanatory gap(Central concept in anti-physicalist arguments): The alleged in-principle inability to intelligibly explain how consciousness arises from physical processes
illusionism(as used in philosophy of mind): The philosophical view that phenomenal consciousness (that subjective feeling quality) doesn't actually exist the way it seems to—it's more like an illusion our brain creates.
irreducible(Personalist anthropology; distinguishes personhood from mere biological individuality): That which is unique and unrepeatable in each human being, by virtue of which a person is not merely an individual of a species but a personal subject.
phenomenal consciousness(Contrasted with functional or physical properties in anti-physicalist arguments): The subjective, felt quality of experience that zombies are stipulated to lack despite physical identity with conscious humans

Connections

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Consciousness & Mind1 linked Skepticism1 linked

Eliminativism must explain what actually exists in place of consciousness; denyi...Humans will never be able to explain the psychophysical link between mind and br...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 2 (1 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit