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Inverse View
It is not the case that Embedding such assumptions into a Bayesian framework does not dissolve the problem of induction but merely relocates it to the prior specification stage.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The problem of induction concerns justifying generalizations from finite samples; Bayesian priors address this directly by modeling uncertainty rationally.
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2.
Relocating an issue is progress if the relocated version is more tractable; prior specification is empirically constrainable in ways induction-at-large is not.
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3.
Priors need not be fully justified independently; they can be justified pragmatically through predictive success and sensitivity analysis of results to prior choice.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Priors in Bayesian inference require justification independent of observed data, creating the same circularity Hume identified in induction.
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2.
Choosing between competing priors lacks a principled, data-independent method, merely pushing the inductive problem one level deeper.
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3.
Without solving how we justify initial credences, Bayesian updating cannot ground knowledge from experience—it only conditions on assumptions.
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