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    Empiricism treats believing or judging as too closely ana... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The Second Puzzle is a good argument against the empiricist account of false judgement

    Empiricism treats believing or judging as too closely analogous to seeing

    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge
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    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge

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    Empiricism validates the old sophistry by assimilating judgement to perceptionThe Second Puzzle exploits the analogy between judgement and perceptionThe Second Puzzle is a good argument against the empiricist account of false jud...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Understanding is closely related to judging, such that both involve th...81%The Second Puzzle exploits the analogy between judgement and perceptio...80%Intuiting is not the same as believing80%R entails that conditions are unsuitable for attaining perceptual just...78%

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    SEP: plato-theaetetus
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    Notice that it is the empiricist who will most naturally tend to rely on this analogy. It is the empiricist who finds it natural to assimilate judgement and knowledge to perception, so far as he can. So we may suggest that the Second Puzzle is a mere sophistry for any decent account of false judgement, but a good argument against the empiricist account of false judgement that Plato is attacking. The moral of the Second Puzzle is that empiricism validates the old sophistry because it treats belie

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