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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Enoch's 'just too-weird' objection shows that moral facts can figure in quasi-explanations of why we care about them, blocking the explanatory exclusion premise independently of regress considerations.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Quasi-explanations that don't causally explain seem to abandon the core challenge: explaining how moral facts causally influence our actual behavior and beliefs.
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    • 2.The 'too-weird' intuition may reflect our cognitive limitations rather than genuine explanatory gaps, making it unreliable for establishing moral ontology.
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    • 3.Even if moral facts fill a conceptual explanatory role, this doesn't defeat exclusion—physical facts can still be causally sufficient without moral facts doing any work.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Quasi-explanations can be legitimate without full causal explanation, allowing moral facts to explain our caring without competing with physical causes.
      ?

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    • 2.The 'too-weird' objection identifies that non-moral explanations of moral concern leave a genuine explanatory gap that moral facts can fill.
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    • 3.If physical facts alone cannot explain why we *should* care about anything, moral facts become explanatorily indispensable regardless of causal exclusion.
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