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    Entailment accounts thus smuggle in contested metaphysica... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Entailment accounts of ontological commitment handle implicit ontological commitment correctly, unlike quantifier accounts.

    Entailment accounts thus smuggle in contested metaphysical theses—such as Fregean concept-realism—disguising first-order ontological disputes as matters of mere logical consequence.

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    Key Terms

    Concept-realism(in metaphysics)
    The view that concepts and ideas exist as real, independent things—not just thoughts in our heads.
    Fregean
    "Fregean" refers to ideas or methods based on the work of Gottlob Frege, a German logician and philosopher from the late 1800s who is considered one of the founders of modern logic. Frege developed revolutionary ways of analyzing language and meaning, particularly the idea that words and sentences have both a sense (the way they present something) and a reference (what they actually point to in the world). His work fundamentally changed how philosophers and mathematicians think about logic, language, and the nature of truth.
    Ontological
    "Ontological" refers to questions about what actually exists or is real. It's concerned with the fundamental nature of being—asking "What kinds of things are there?" rather than "How do we know about them?" For example, an ontological question might be whether numbers, ideas, or God actually exist as real things, or if they're just human inventions.
    entailment(Conceptualist framework)

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    Understood in terms of truth at a world
    first-order(describes the type of existence claims being discussed)
    A way of talking about things directly as they are, without stepping back to talk about the rules or assumptions underlying our talk—like saying 'the cat is on the mat' instead of discussing how language describes spatial relationships.
    logical consequence(WL II, 391–395; noted as similar to Tarski 1956, 419)
    A proposition s is a logical consequence of a set of premises σ if and only if s follows from σ with respect to the sequence of all extra-logical simple ideas contained in σ or s.
    metaphysical(Ayer's Logical Positivist usage)
    Language that purports to refer beyond the physical world and lacks empirical consequences, which Ayer classifies as not literally significant
    smuggle in(as a way of describing hidden assumptions)
    To introduce an idea or assumption into an argument without openly stating it or proving it deserves to be there.

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    Modality & Possibility1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

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    Entailment accounts of ontological commitment handle implicit ontological commit...

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