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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Episodic memory is logically sufficient for personal identity across time

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.A person can sincerely seem to remember an experience they never had, as Locke's own prince-cobbler case implies and Reid's brave officer paradox exposes.
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    • 2.If apparent memory can be phenomenologically indistinguishable from genuine memory, memory cannot by itself constitute identity without circularity.
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    • 3.Establishing that a memory is 'genuine' already presupposes the numerical identity of the rememberer, making memory logically insufficient as a non-circular ground for identity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Sydney Shoemaker and Derek Parfit demonstrate that psychological continuity via memory is compatible with fission cases where one person branches into two distinct persons.
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    • 2.If episodic memory were logically sufficient for personal identity, fission would entail that one person is numerically identical to two distinct persons simultaneously, violating transitivity of identity.
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    • 3.Because memory-based continuity fails to individuate in branching cases, it cannot be logically sufficient for personal identity across time.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If a person episodically remembers an event, that person must have existed at the time of the event
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    • 2.The Previous Awareness Condition holds that episodic memory requires the rememberer's prior awareness of the remembered event
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    • 3.Semantic memory (e.g., knowing that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo) does not entail the rememberer's existence at the time of the event
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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.