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    Events conceived as facts or fact-like particulars are fi... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Events conceived as facts or fact-like particulars are fine-grained entities that cannot be freely re-described or re-identified under different conceptualizations.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Facts corresponding to non-equivalent propositions are distinct from one another.
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    • 2.If events are assimilated to facts, events inherit the distinctness conditions of facts.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Davidson's extensionalist semantics shows that event identity is governed by causal roles, not propositional content or conceptualization.
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    • 2.If the same causal nexus underlies 'the stabbing' and 'the killing,' these are one event regardless of how propositions carve them.
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    • 3.Therefore, events resist fine-grained individuation even when the descriptions corresponding to them are logically non-equivalent.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kim's property-exemplification account, though fine-grained, still permits re-identification when the same constituent triple recurs across different linguistic framings.
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    • 2.Logical non-equivalence of propositions does not entail distinctness of the underlying property, object, and time constituting the event.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation1 linked

    Related

    Davidson's extensionalist semantics shows that event identity is governed by cau...Facts corresponding to non-equivalent propositions are distinct from one another...If events are assimilated to facts, events inherit the distinctness conditions o...If the same causal nexus underlies 'the stabbing' and 'the killing,' these are o...
    +3 moreShow less
    Kim's property-exemplification account, though fine-grained, still permits re-id...Logical non-equivalence of propositions does not entail distinctness of the unde...Therefore, events resist fine-grained individuation even when the descriptions c...

    Similar

    Events construed as facts are too coarse-grained, collapsing into a si...81%Events conceived as facts individuate as finely as the facts that corr...79%Primitive entities are those not to be explained or defined in terms o...79%There is a primitive distinction between entities that are fundamental...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: events
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    Some philosophers, however, conceive of the link between events and facts as being much closer than this—close enough to justify assimilating the two categories (Wilson 1974; Tegtmeier 2000) or at least treating both as species of the same “state of affairs” genus (Chisholm 1970). This has two main consequences. On the one hand, because facts corresponding to non-equivalent propositions are distinct, events conceived of as facts or fact-like particulars are fine-grained entities that cannot be f
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit