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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Exclusionary behavior toward the outgroup was selected as the dominant coordination strategy because it served as an efficient focal point for ingroup coordination.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Coordination games permit multiple equilibria, so exclusionary behavior was not uniquely efficient — inclusive coordination norms also satisfy focal point conditions.
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    • 2.Schelling's focal point theory requires salience, but salience is itself shaped by prior political mobilization, not inherent strategic logic.
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    • 3.The explanandum (why exclusion rather than inclusion became salient) is smuggled into the explanans, rendering the argument circular.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kuran's preference falsification theory demonstrates that ethnic exclusion cascades from elite manipulation, not spontaneous coordination equilibria among ordinary actors.
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    • 2.If exclusionary behavior were merely an efficient focal point, we would expect symmetric adoption across all intergroup conflicts, but empirical variance requires non-game-theoretic explanations such as institutional design and historical grievance.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The most distinctively Serbian (or Hutu) behavior — the doing of which signalled coordination — was to exclude Croats (or Tutsi).
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    • 2.Strategies with efficient focal points are selected in coordination games.
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    • 3.Exclusionary behavior therefore became the dominant coordinated strategy.
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