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It is not the case that Expected utility comparisons presuppose well-defined probability assignments over outcomes, which are unavailable in genuine Knightian uncertainty.
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Reasons For
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1.
Agents regularly make rational choices under Knightian uncertainty using heuristics, satisficing, and comparative preference orderings without precise probabilities.
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2.
Subjective probability assignments (credences) can represent genuine uncertainty through imprecise or set-valued probabilities, which EU theory can accommodate.
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3.
The claim conflates the impossibility of objective probability with the impossibility of rational choice, but uncertainty doesn't entail irrationality.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Knightian uncertainty involves fundamentally unquantifiable risks where historical frequency data and theoretical models both fail to constrain probabilities.
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2.
Expected utility theory mathematically requires precise probability assignments; vague or range-based probabilities cannot satisfy its axiomatic structure.
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3.
When probabilities are unavailable, agents cannot compute expected values, rendering utility comparisons between acts formally indeterminate.
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