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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Explanatory reasons were not distinguished from motivatin... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Motivating reasons are mental states.

    Explanatory reasons were not distinguished from motivating reasons.

    CausationMoral Responsibility
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    Moral ResponsibilityCausation

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    Consciousness & Mind2 linked
    Motivating reasons are mental states.

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    Explanatory reasons are mental states.Motivating reasons are mental states.

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    Psychologism about motivating reasons is false87%If motivating reasons were facts and putative facts, then some of the ...87%If motivating reasons were facts (or putative facts), then we can, and...85%An explanation of why some desires fail to generate reasons may reveal...84%

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    Psychologism is very appealing. For it seems right that when an agent acts for a reason, he acts motivated by an end that he desires (an end towards which he has a “pro-attitude”) and guided by a belief about how to achieve that end. Because of this, it is possible to explain his action by citing his desiring and his believing the relevant things. To return to our example, we can explain why Othello kills Desdemona by citing his wanting to defend his honour and his believing that, given that Des

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