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    Extensionalist identity conditions for properties — two p... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Extensionalist identity conditions for properties — two properties are identical iff they are co-extensional — cannot work as a general criterion.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Necessarily co-extensional properties can still be distinct: 'triangular' and 'trilateral' differ in inferential role despite sharing all possible instances.
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    • 2.Chalmers and Jackson's two-dimensional semantics shows properties have both primary and secondary intensions, making modal profile part of property individuation.
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    • 3.A criterion that fails in even one possible world fails as a general criterion, and accidental co-extension is nomologically possible in the actual world.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Shoemaker's causal theory of properties individuates them by causal powers, so 'renate' and 'cordate' are distinct because they ground different counterfactual dependencies.
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    • 2.Armstrong's truthmaker principle requires that distinct causal roles in nature correspond to distinct universals, independent of actual extension.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.There are seemingly distinct properties that share the same extension, such as having a heart and having kidneys.
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    • 2.Wildly different properties such as being spherical and weighing 2 kilos could by accident be co-extensive.
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    • 3.If two distinct properties can share an extension, then co-extension is insufficient to establish property identity.
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    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    A criterion that fails in even one possible world fails as a general criterion, ...Armstrong's truthmaker principle requires that distinct causal roles in nature c...Chalmers and Jackson's two-dimensional semantics shows properties have both prim...If two distinct properties can share an extension, then co-extension is insuffic...
    +4 moreShow less
    Necessarily co-extensional properties can still be distinct: 'triangular' and 't...Shoemaker's causal theory of properties individuates them by causal powers, so '...There are seemingly distinct properties that share the same extension, such as h...Wildly different properties such as being spherical and weighing 2 kilos could b...

    Similar

    If two distinct properties can share an extension, then co-extension i...88%Even if two descriptions or concepts refer to one and the same propert...74%Type-type identity theory requires that mental properties are strictly...73%By Leibniz's Law, identical objects share all properties72%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: properties
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    In an effort to provide identity conditions for properties, one could mimic those for sets, or equate the former with the latter (as in class nominalism; see note 3), and provide the following extensionalist identity conditions: two properties are identical iff they are co-extensional. This criterion can hardly work, however, since there are seemingly distinct properties with the same extension, such as having a heart and having kidneys, and even wildly different properties such as spherical and
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit