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    Failure to distinguish generic types from disjunctive con... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The subset-of-causal-relations account fails to adequately accommodate Non-disjunctive specification

    Failure to distinguish generic types from disjunctive constructions of determinate types means the account does not block metaphysical reducibility of determinable types to disjunctions of determinate types

    CausationModality & Possibility
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityCausation

    Key Terms

    Determinable types(metaphysics/ontology)
    General categories that can be made more specific—'color' is a determinable because it can be narrowed down to 'red,' 'blue,' etc.
    Determinate types(metaphysics/ontology)
    Specific, fully-defined categories where all the details are settled—like 'red' or 'blue' (as opposed to just 'color').
    Disjunctive constructions(logic/metaphysics)

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    A way of describing something by listing separate options connected by 'or'—like saying 'the light is either red or blue or green' instead of just 'the light is colored.'
    Generic types(metaphysics/ontology)
    General categories or kinds of things that don't specify exact details—like 'color' before you decide if it's red, blue, or green.
    Metaphysical reducibility(metaphysics)
    The idea that one kind of thing can be broken down into or explained entirely in terms of other, simpler kinds of things.

    Related

    Disjunctive types may also have causal relations in the intersections of their d...If disjunctive types share the same causal intersection as generic types, then t...The subset-of-causal-relations account fails to adequately accommodate Non-disju...

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    If disjunctive types share the same causal intersection as generic typ...92%Determinable types are not metaphysically reducible to (identified wit...89%Token-distinctness blocks reductive identification of determinable typ...85%If a determinate type is conjunctively analyzable into genus and diffe...82%

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    SEP: determinate-determinables
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    A subset-of-causal-relations account of generic/determinable universals promisingly accommodates many features of determination, for reasons similar to those attaching to powers-based accounts, below. It also ensures the metaphysical irreducibility of a generic/determinable type to any specific/determinate type, by the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (if \(G\) has only a proper subset of causal relations of \(S\), \(G\) cannot be identified with \(S\)); and if this proper subset

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