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    False models serve a legitimate epistemic function in sci... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    False models serve a legitimate epistemic function in science

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • False models can be used as means to arrive at true theories
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Epistemic legitimacy requires that a representation reliably tracks truth; a model known to be false cannot reliably track truth.
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    • 2.If false models produce true conclusions, this success is accidental rather than epistemically grounded, constituting luck rather than knowledge.
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    • 3.Epistemic luck, as argued by Pritchard, is incompatible with genuine epistemic function even when true beliefs result.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism holds that science aims at empirical adequacy, not truth; false models are thus not legitimate but merely tolerated instrumentally.
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    • 2.A representation that is instrumentally useful but known false conflates pragmatic value with epistemic value, collapsing a distinction essential to scientific realism.
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    Related

    A representation that is instrumentally useful but known false conflates pragmat...Epistemic legitimacy requires that a representation reliably tracks truth; a mod...Epistemic luck, as argued by Pritchard, is incompatible with genuine epistemic f...False models can be used as means to arrive at true theories
    +2 moreShow less
    If false models produce true conclusions, this success is accidental rather than...Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism holds that science aims at empirical adeq...

    Similar

    False models can be used as means to arrive at true theories83%Many models in science are both logical and representational models si...83%Naturalized epistemology operates within science80%Players may not know the true state of their epistemic model.80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: models-science
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    But is it really the truth of the explanans that makes the model explanatory? Other authors pursue a more radical line and argue that false models explain not only despite their falsity, but in fact because of their falsity. Cartwright (1983: 44) maintains that “the truth doesn’t explain much”. In her so-called “simulacrum account of explanation”, she suggests that we explain a phenomenon by constructing a model that fits the phenomenon into the basic framework of a grand theory (1983: Ch. 8). O
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit