- Conceptually prior(as used in epistemology)
- Something that is logically or mentally more basic or fundamental—you need to understand it before you can understand something else.
- Fischer and Ravizza(as the originators of the reasons-responsiveness account)
- Two contemporary philosophers (John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza) who developed an influential theory about what makes people morally responsible for their actions.
- Reasons-responsiveness account(as the main philosophical framework being discussed)
- A theory that says you're morally responsible for an action if you're able to understand moral reasons (like 'stealing hurts people') and can adjust your behavior based on those reasons.
- Social practice(where habitus operates in real life)
- The actual day-to-day actions and behaviors that people do within society, as opposed to theory or ideas.
- agent(Economics terminology applied to medical ethics)
- The party in a principal-agent relationship who is instructed to produce the good or service on the principal's behalf — in the medical context, the doctor
- capacity(Theory of capacity)
- A subject's ability to make decisions, assessed by paradigm examples and the presence of necessary (and possibly sufficient) abilities.
- grounded in(whether distinctness or identity is explained by intrinsic features)
- To be explained by or to have its reason or basis in something else—like how a tree being wet is grounded in (explained by) recent rain.
- moral responsibility(The author argues for a pluralistic understanding rather than a Kantian-exclusive one)
- A normative concept whose scope is contested; the passage implies it encompasses at least Kantian notions (centered on individual rational agency) and other notions (potentially sociological, collective, or non-individualist in character)