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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Fischer's semi-compatibilism shows robust moral responsibility requires only reasons-responsiveness, a capacity fully preserved under determinism, making incompatibilist intuitions diagnostically misleading rather than philosophically decisive.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Reasons-responsiveness may be necessary for responsibility but insufficient—agents also need control over their reasons-responsive mechanisms themselves.
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    • 2.Incompatibilist intuitions reflect deep commitments to desert and genuine alternative possibilities that cannot be dismissed as mere diagnostic error.
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    • 3.Semi-compatibilism avoids the hard problem by narrowing responsibility's scope rather than solving whether determinism permits moral agency.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Moral responsibility practices (blame, praise, punishment) functionally require only that agents respond to reasons, which determinism preserves.
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    • 2.Incompatibilist intuitions about ultimate origination lack independent justification and may reflect cognitive biases about agency rather than metaphysical truth.
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    • 3.Fischer's account explains why we hold deterministic agents responsible while avoiding the incoherence of libertarian free will requirements.
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