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    Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence implies that ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence does not provide a logically necessary condition on omnipotence.

    Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence implies that in W, at t, Oscar has the power to actualize (e), because: (i) (e) is not a member of a world-type-for-Oscar; (ii) the same world-type-for-Oscar is true in both W and W*; (iii) it is possible for someone at t to actualize (e) in W*, which shares the same history up to t as W.

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    Topics

    Divine Attributes

    Key Terms

    Actualize(as describing what power someone has)
    To make something real or bring it into existence; to turn a possibility into reality.
    Flint and Freddoso(as philosophers referenced in a discussion of omnipotence)
    Two contemporary philosophers who developed a specific theory about what it means for God (or any being) to be all-powerful.
    History up to t(as describing what remains the same between two possible worlds)
    Everything that has happened up until a specific time point (t); the past events that are already fixed and cannot be changed.

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    W and W*(as notation for different possible worlds)
    Shorthand symbols representing different possible worlds or scenarios—think of them as alternate realities to compare.
    World-type-for-Oscar(as a technical concept distinguishing different scenarios)
    A category or classification describing what kind of world it is from Oscar's perspective, based on what properties or facts define it.
    modal(in logic and metaphysics)
    Dealing with possibility and necessity—questions about what could be true, what must be true, and what's merely contingent (could go either way).
    omnipotence(Bruno's theological framework)
    God's primary attribute as designated by the Apostles' Creed, entailing that all possibilities are actualized

    Related

    A non-omnipotent agent can actualize (e)—bringing it about that a snowflake fall...Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence does not provide a logically necessa...In W*, at t some non-omnipotent agent actualizes (e), but in W, Oscar at t canno...There are possible worlds W and W* sharing the same history up to time t, where ...
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    Therefore, Flint and Freddoso's account requires that Oscar has a power he in fa...

    Similar

    Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence does not provide a logical...83%In W*, at t some non-omnipotent agent actualizes (e), but in W, Oscar ...82%All of God's properties are essential: God is essentially omniscient, ...80%A non-omnipotent agent can actualize (e)—bringing it about that a snow...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: omnipotence
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    The notion of actualization employed in this account of omnipotence calls for some explanation. If an agent, \(S\), brings about a state of affairs, \(p\), then \(S\) actualizes \(p\). However, this account presupposes that an agent may [weakly] actualize another agent’s making a free decision without bringing about or causing that decision. In particular, it is assumed that an agent may weakly actualize a decision that is free in the libertarian sense by bringing about the antecedent of a true “counterfactual of freedom.”

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