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Inverse View
It is not the case that Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis shows that positing representational levels does not explain intentionality but merely relocates the explanatory burden.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Explaining intentionality at one level may be genuinely explanatory even if it doesn't explain intentionality at all levels simultaneously.
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2.
LOT provides a naturalistic account of how thoughts have constituent structure and semantic properties, advancing explanation even if incomplete.
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3.
Burden-shifting itself can be legitimate progress: explaining mental content in terms of syntax is more tractable than dualist alternatives.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Mental representations require interpretation to possess meaning, but interpretation itself is a mental process requiring representation.
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2.
Positing multiple representational levels (thought, language, symbols) multiplies explanatory problems rather than solving the original one.
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3.
Without an account of how ANY level of representation acquires intrinsic intentionality, the theory leaves the core problem untouched.
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