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It is not the case that Fodor's methodological solipsism targets computational individuation, not the exhaustive individuation of all mental state types.
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Reasons For
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1.
If computational processes are individuated internally, but mental states require external factors, the boundary between them becomes unclear and unstable.
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2.
Fodor's own arguments about intentionality and semantic content suggest externalism applies broadly to mental states, not merely narrow computational subsets.
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3.
Restricting methodological solipsism to computation arbitrarily splits what may be a unified phenomenon of content-bearing mental representation.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Computational processes operate on syntactic properties that are intrinsic to the system, independent of external reference relations.
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2.
Fodor explicitly limits methodological solipsism to explaining how mental content is computed, not to exhausting mental ontology.
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3.
Distinguishing computational individuation from metaphysical individuation preserves internalism while accommodating externalist intuitions about content.
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