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    Fodor's multiple realizability argument shows that higher... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The Nagel model of reduction can be refined to retain its spirit while avoiding many of its original problems

    Fodor's multiple realizability argument shows that higher-level kinds systematically resist identification with any single lower-level physical kind.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Pain occurs in humans, aliens, and robots with different neural/physical substrates, yet all genuinely instantiate the same mental kind.
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    • 2.If mental kinds reduced to physical kinds, then different physical structures could not realize identical mental states across species.
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    • 3.The causal powers of mental states depend on their functional role, not their physical composition, supporting functional over physical identity.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Multiple realizability arguments assume kinds are defined by intrinsic properties rather than origin and composition—a contestable metaphysical claim.
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    • 2.Even if pain has multiple physical bases, each actual instance still has a single physical kind; multiple realizability doesn't entail non-identity.
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    • 3.Higher-level kinds may supervene on and be reducible to physics without one-to-one mapping; many-to-one mapping is consistent with physicalism.
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    Related

    Even if pain has multiple physical bases, each actual instance still has a singl...Higher-level kinds may supervene on and be reducible to physics without one-to-o...If mental kinds reduced to physical kinds, then different physical structures co...Multiple realizability arguments assume kinds are defined by intrinsic propertie...
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    Pain occurs in humans, aliens, and robots with different neural/physical substra...The Nagel model of reduction can be refined to retain its spirit while avoiding ...The causal powers of mental states depend on their functional role, not their ph...

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    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit