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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that For a hypothesis to assign a determinate probability r to an outcome, it must already presuppose a well-defined probability space, yet specifying that space typically requires background commitments that are themselves empirically contentious.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Mathematical probability spaces can be stipulated formally without empirical commitment; background theory doesn't determine the mathematical structure itself.
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    • 2.The circularity claim conflates the epistemology of learning what space applies with the ontology of whether spaces can be well-defined independent of knowledge.
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    • 3.Many scientific hypotheses successfully assign determinate probabilities using standard spaces (normal distributions, Poisson processes) without resolving deeper metaphysical disputes.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Probability assignments require partitioning outcome space, and what counts as a relevant partition depends on background theory about what's physically possible.
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    • 2.Choosing between competing probability models (frequentist, Bayesian, propensity) involves prior commitments about causation and randomness that empirical data underdetermines.
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    • 3.Any determinate probability presupposes a measure over possibilities, but identifying which possibilities exist depends on contested metaphysical assumptions.
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