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    For Leibniz, properties possessed only for part of an obj... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Leibniz's monads bear change differently from Aristotle's individual substances

    For Leibniz, properties possessed only for part of an object's existence are still essential to it

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    For Aristotle, properties an object must possess and properties it possesses thr...Leibniz's monads bear change differently from Aristotle's individual substancesTherefore the Leibnizian distinction between essential and accidental properties...

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    For Aristotle, properties an object must possess and properties it pos...87%Non-existent objects can possess properties.86%Essential properties are necessary properties — they cannot be otherwi...85%Only existing objects can possess properties.85%

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    The analogy with thought hardly emphasises the independence of substance! Nevertheless, created substances do constitute the created world, and do, in that sense, meet criterion (i) for being substance. They are also the subjects of predication, so they meet criterion (iii). Leibniz’s substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion (iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle’s individual substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties essentially and some accidentally

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