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    For the argument involving Boris and Jerry to be valid, t... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The 'that'-clauses in ordinary belief ascriptions do not refer to sentence tokens of any kind.

    For the argument involving Boris and Jerry to be valid, the two 'that'-clauses must refer to the same thing.

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    Since there is no sentence token — external or mentalese — that both 'that'-clau...The 'that'-clauses in ordinary belief ascriptions do not refer to sentence token...The first 'that'-clause cannot refer to a mentalese sentence token, because such...

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    The first 'that'-clause cannot refer to an external sentence token of a natural ...
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    This argument seems clearly valid; but this seems to rule out the idea that the belief reports here are about sentence tokens. For (a) in order to account for the validity of the argument, we have to take the two ‘that’-clauses to refer to the same thing, and (b) there is no sentence token that they could both refer to. First of all, they couldn't refer to any external sentence token (or, for that matter, any sentence type associated with any natural language), because (i) if the first ‘that’-cl

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