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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Forgiveness and excuse are distinct concepts. — Carmelics
    Home/Forgiveness & Mercy
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Forgiveness and excuse are distinct concepts.

    Forgiveness & Mercy
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.When conduct is excused, the agent is not morally responsible and blameworthy for that conduct.
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    • 2.When one is forgiven for one's conduct, this does not entail that the wrongdoer was not morally responsible and blameworthy.
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    • 3.Forgiven agents can be morally responsible and blameworthy, but agents who are excused are not morally responsible and blameworthy.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Strawson's reactive attitudes account, both forgiveness and excuse involve modifying the stance of resentment toward an offender.
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    • 2.If forgiveness and excuse both achieve the same moral psychological endpoint—the relinquishment of resentment—their conceptual distinctness reduces to a difference of degree, not kind.
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    • 3.A difference of causal pathway to identical moral psychological outcomes does not establish that two concepts are categorically distinct rather than subspecies of a single genus.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Jeffrie Murphy and Charles Griswold acknowledge that partial excuses (diminished capacity, coercion) attenuate but do not eliminate moral responsibility.
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    • 2.When responsibility is only partially mitigated, forgiveness and partial excuse operate on the same residual blameworthy agency simultaneously, making their boundary indeterminate rather than sharp.
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    • 3.Conceptual distinctness requires a principled boundary, and the existence of a continuous spectrum of responsibility-mitigating conditions dissolves any such sharp boundary between excuse and forgiveness.
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    Topics

    Forgiveness & Mercy

    Related

    A difference of causal pathway to identical moral psychological outcomes does no...Conceptual distinctness requires a principled boundary, and the existence of a c...Forgiven agents can be morally responsible and blameworthy, but agents who are e...If forgiveness and excuse both achieve the same moral psychological endpoint—the...
    +5 moreShow less
    Jeffrie Murphy and Charles Griswold acknowledge that partial excuses (diminished...On Strawson's reactive attitudes account, both forgiveness and excuse involve mo...When conduct is excused, the agent is not morally responsible and blameworthy fo...When one is forgiven for one's conduct, this does not entail that the wrongdoer ...When responsibility is only partially mitigated, forgiveness and partial excuse ...

    Similar

    Forgiving is not equivalent to excusing.75%Reconciliation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for f...70%It would be fitting for Todd to blame Alfred, and for Alfred to apolog...70%If it is fitting for a person to blame the wrongdoer and for the wrong...69%

    Source

    AI-extracted3/3 agreementValid
    SEP: forgiveness
    View source passageHide passage
    When conduct is excused, this entails that the agent who so acted is not morally responsible and blameworthy for that conduct. But when one is forgiven for one’s conduct, this does not entail that the wrongdoer was not morally responsible and blameworthy for her conduct. It is often claimed that a necessary condition for forgiveness is that the wrongdoer is morally blameworthy for her conduct (see, e.g., Bash 2007: 5; Haber 1991: 33; Murphy 2003; Allais 2008; and Hieronymi 2001). Perhaps this is true (although see Gamlund 2011). But we need not insist, as a matter of conceptual necessity, that...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The premises accurately capture the passage's reasoning that forgiveness and excuse are distinct because they differ in their relationship to moral responsibility and blameworthiness, and this argument is explicitly present in the source passage.

    Confidence: High confidence; the argument is explicitly laid out in the text.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit