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Inverse View
It is not the case that Frankfurt's cases of willing under uncertainty demonstrate agents genuinely will outcomes they assign non-trivial probability of failure.
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Reasons For
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1.
Willing an outcome requires belief in its achievability; non-trivial failure probability may indicate the agent wills attempting, not the outcome.
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2.
Frankfurt's cases conflate conditional intentions ('I will if conditions hold') with categorical willings of specific outcomes themselves.
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3.
Genuine willing requires effective causal control; acknowledging failure probability suggests recognition of that control's limits.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Willing requires commitment to an outcome as one's goal; uncertainty about success doesn't eliminate this motivational commitment.
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2.
We ordinarily ascribe genuine willing to agents attempting difficult tasks (surgery, mountain climbing) despite significant failure risk.
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3.
Frankfurt's cases show agents form stable intentions toward outcomes they believe achievable, which is sufficient for genuine willing.
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