Frege's context principle notwithstanding, a concept that admits no coherent plurality of instances fails the criterion for genuine conceptual generality and instead functions as a disguised proper name.

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Coherent plurality of instances(as the criterion being discussed): The ability for something to apply to multiple different examples without running into contradictions—like how 'chair' can coherently refer to many different chairs.
Concept (in philosophy)(as the philosophical subject being evaluated): A general idea or category that applies to many different things—like the concept 'dog' applies to all dogs, or 'redness' applies to all red things.
Criterion for genuine conceptual generality(as the test being applied to concepts): A standard or test for deciding whether something is truly a general concept (applying to many things) rather than just a label for one specific thing.
Disguised proper name(as what happens when a concept fails the test of generality): Something that looks like a general concept on the surface, but actually only refers to one specific thing (like a proper name does)—hence it's 'disguised.'

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