Frege's distinction between concept and object establishes that singular terms must secure determinate reference through sense alone, without relying on set-membership presuppositions.
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The mode of presentation by which a name presents its referent; the component of meaning that can differ between two co-referential names
set-membership presuppositions(what Frege argued we should NOT need to rely on)
Hidden assumptions that something belongs to a group or category. This phrase suggests assuming something is 'part of' a collection in order to make sense of it.
singular terms(Fregean semantics and ontological commitment)
Expressions whose semantic role is to refer to objects; Frege called these 'proper names'.