Functionalism and representationalism are not obviously compatible positions.

Consciousness & Mind

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1.Functionalism holds that to believe is to be in a state that fills a particular causal role.
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2.Representationalism holds that beliefs are essentially states that represent how things stand in the world.
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3.It is not clear how a state can represent the world simply by virtue of playing a causal role in a cognitive system.
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The compatibility of functionalism and representationalism is not evident on its face, though a number of prominent contemporary philosophers appear to embrace both positions (e.g., Fodor 1968, 1975, 1981, 1990; Armstrong 1973; Harman 1973; Lycan 1981a, 1981b; Stalnaker 1984; Lewis 1994). As Millikan (1984), Papineau (1984), and others have suggested, it seems one thing to say that to believe is to be in a state that fills a particular causal role, and it seems quite another to say that beliefs

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Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 1 (0 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit