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Inverse View
It is not the case that G.E. Moore's open question argument establishes that defining goodness by any natural property, including functional success, commits the naturalistic fallacy.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The open question argument assumes conceptual non-identity proves metaphysical non-identity, but water and H2O are identical despite distinct concepts.
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2.
Moore provides no independent criterion for detecting the naturalistic fallacy besides the open-question intuition, making the argument circular.
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3.
Some natural properties (like promoting flourishing) may be genuinely constitutive of goodness rather than merely correlated with it.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
For any natural property P, we can coherently ask 'Is P really good?' without contradiction, suggesting goodness is not identical to P.
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2.
Equating goodness with natural properties treats an evaluative concept as if it were purely descriptive, committing a logical category mistake.
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3.
Functional success describes what something does; goodness describes whether that deserves approval—these answer different questions.
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