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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi establishes that pervasion (vyāpti) is undermined precisely when the reason is present alongside the confirmed absence of the probandum, not merely its non-presence.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The status of 'confirmed absence' itself may depend on vyāpti; this risks circularity in using absence-confirmation to undermine pervasion relations.
      ?

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    • 2.Non-presence and confirmed absence may collapse into one category in practice, making Gaṅgeśa's distinction metaphysically unmotivated rather than substantive.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Confirmed absence (pratiyogi-śūnya) is epistemically distinct from mere non-perception, requiring active counterevidence rather than passive ignorance.
      ?

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    • 2.Vyāpti requires the reason's necessary sufficiency; simultaneous presence of reason and confirmed absence of effect logically entails the pervasion relation fails.
      ?

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    • 3.Gaṅgeśa's distinction preserves inferential validity by preventing absurd counterexamples where unobserved effects could still sustain faulty pervasion claims.
      ?

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