Gibson's ecological direct realism, even on its strongest reading, cannot override the inferential computational architecture demonstrated in motion aftereffects and phi phenomena.

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Computational architecture(as used in philosophy of computation): The underlying structure and design of how a computer or algorithm actually works—the 'blueprint' that determines its approach to solving problems.
Ecological direct realism(Gibson's main philosophical position about how we perceive reality): A theory of perception claiming that we directly experience the real world as it is, without our brain needing to construct or infer what we're seeing based on sensory data.
Gibson(the theory being discussed is his): James J. Gibson was a psychologist who studied how we perceive the world directly through our senses, without needing our brain to interpret hidden mental images.
Motion aftereffects(an example of a phenomenon suggesting the brain does computational work): A visual illusion where, after watching something move in one direction for a while, stationary objects appear to move in the opposite direction—evidence that the brain actively interprets motion rather than just passively seeing it.

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