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    Goldie and Searle argue that emotions exhibit 'world-to-m... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Emotions are feelings devoid of intentional objects

    Goldie and Searle argue that emotions exhibit 'world-to-mind' direction of fit, meaning their intentional content is not adventitiously attached but internally structures the phenomenal character.

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    Key Terms

    Adventitiously attached(as describing what the intentional content of emotions is NOT)
    Added to something from the outside by accident or circumstance, rather than being a natural or essential part of it. Think of it like a label stuck onto a product versus a part built into it.
    Goldie(as a philosopher studying emotions)
    Peter Goldie is a contemporary philosopher who studies emotions and how we experience them. He's known for exploring what emotions actually are and how they shape the way we see the world.
    Intentional content(Rey 2006: 242)
    Whatever we understand x to be when we use the idiom 'representation of x' but there is no real x
    Internally structures(as how intentional content relates to emotional experience)
    Shapes or organizes something from within as a fundamental part of it. Instead of being added on, it's woven into the very nature of what something is.

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    Searle
    John Searle is an American philosopher famous for asking whether machines can truly think and understand things the way humans do. He argued that just because a computer can process information and respond correctly doesn't mean it actually *understands* what it's doing—like how someone could follow instructions to respond in Chinese without actually knowing the language. His ideas have deeply influenced debates about artificial intelligence and what makes human consciousness unique.
    direction of fit(Distinguishing cognitive from conative mental states)
    A property of psychological states indicating whether the state aims to match the world (belief: mind-to-world) or aims to change the world to match the state (desire: world-to-mind)
    phenomenal character(Used to distinguish the mere presence of experience from the specific qualitative nature of individual experiences)
    The qualitative, subjective 'what it is like' aspect of mental states; the property of having qualia
    world-to-mind direction of fit(Characterizing the nature of desire)
    The property of a mental state (paradigmatically desire) whereby the state aims to make the world match its propositional content rather than answering to how the world currently is, and may persist even when the world does not cooperate

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPerception1 linked

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    Emotions are feelings devoid of intentional objects

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