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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Goldman's (G*1) and Sobel's (S) actualist views are objectionable on possibilist grounds

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Goldman's and Sobel's views allow agents to avoid incurring moral obligations simply in virtue of having an imperfect moral character
      ?

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    • 2.Allowing agents to avoid obligations due to imperfect character lets agents get off the moral hook too easily
      ?

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    • 3.Actualism is committed to this even when agents are disposed to behave badly because they intend to behave badly
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant's Formula of Humanity demands we evaluate agents by what they could do as rational beings, not merely by their contingent inclinations.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If actualism excuses agents whose bad intentions limit their options, it collapses the distinction between moral evaluation and causal prediction.
      ?

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    • 3.Moral theory must be normative, not merely descriptive of what agents happen to be disposed to do given their actual volitional states.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Parfit's principle that agents bear responsibility for their own predictable failures implies obligations extend to foreseeable counterfactual actions.
      ?

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    • 2.Allowing vicious character to shrink an agent's obligation set creates a perverse incentive: cultivating bad intentions becomes a strategy for moral exemption.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.