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    Haecceitism is false: there are no primitive facts about ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→An individual a has property P essentially

    Haecceitism is false: there are no primitive facts about which individual in another world is identical to or a counterpart of a given actual individual (Adams, 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity').

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    Key Terms

    Haecceitism
    A theory of primitive identity of individuals across possible worlds.
    Primitive facts(used to describe the kind of facts haecceitism claims exist)
    Basic, fundamental facts that don't need to be explained by or reduced to other facts; they just are what they are.
    Primitive identity(in metaphysics)
    A fundamental, basic quality that makes something uniquely itself, independent of any other properties or relationships.
    Robert Adams(the author being cited)
    A prominent American philosopher who wrote influential work on metaphysics and the nature of identity; this quote is from his essay on what makes something uniquely itself.
    counterpart(Lewis's modal realism; used to ground de re modal claims without trans-world identity)

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    An object y in world w2 is a counterpart of object x in world w1 if y resembles x and nothing else in w2 resembles x more than y.
    possible worlds(Leibniz's modal semantics, anticipating contemporary possible-worlds semantics)
    Worlds that have existence in a tenuous sense; fictional worlds used to characterize the nature of possibles that are never actualized

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    An individual a has property P essentially

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