Haslanger's distinction between 'property-variation perdurance' and 'mereological perdurance' shows that processes can have temporal parts under a thin ontology that does not commit to the full reality of past and future.
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Property-variation perdurance(as one type of temporal persistence Haslanger distinguishes)
A theory about how objects persist through time by saying that objects stay the same thing even though their properties (like color or location) change over time.
Temporal parts(Four-dimensionalist solution to the problem of change)
Distinct stages of a temporally extended object, such that the puppy Oscar and the old gray-muzzled Oscar are distinct parts of the whole Oscar
Thin ontology(as the type of ontology that allows for processes to have temporal parts)
A way of thinking about reality that assumes fewer kinds of things actually exist, avoiding unnecessary or controversial claims about what's real.
perdurance(Lewis's account of change)
The account on which objects persist by having distinct temporal parts at different times