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    It is not the case that Higher-level theories are legitimately reduced to lower-level theories when relatively simple mappings exist from solutions of the lower-level theory to solutions of the higher-level theory over a certain domain.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Nagel and Kim argue that multiple realizability entails that higher-level predicates cannot be systematically mapped to lower-level predicates.
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    • 2.If mental or biological states are multiply realizable, no relatively simple mapping from lower-level solutions can capture their generality.
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    • 3.Therefore, the existence of simple mappings is too strong a condition and would wrongly exclude legitimate higher-level sciences from counting as reduced.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Putnam's functionalism holds that higher-level kinds are defined by causal-functional roles, not by any particular physical realization.
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    • 2.A mapping from lower-level solutions that merely tracks physical implementation cannot capture the invariance that defines the higher-level kind.
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    • 3.Hence 'relatively simple mappings' between solutions misidentifies what would constitute a genuine inter-theoretic reduction of functionally defined higher-level theories.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Functional instantiation of a higher-level theory by a lower-level theory requires relatively simple mappings between their respective solutions.
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    • 2.If such mappings exist, higher-level structures are real patterns at the more fundamental level.
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