Skip to content
Carmelics
Topics
Thinkers
Changes
Contributors
Loading account…
Statements
321,452
Perspectives
108,905
Topics
42
Home
/
Original
/
inverse
See Original
Inverse View
It is not the case that Hume's challenge concerns the justification of inductive inference, not the updating of prior probabilities given new evidence.
?
Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.
Reasons For
1 perspective
Reason for
?
1.
Bayesian inference *is* inductive inference—updating priors with evidence embodies the same justificatory demands Hume raised about induction.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Hume's skepticism applies equally to both: why assume past frequency ratios ground future predictions, whether via rules or probability calculus?
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
Distinguishing inference-justification from probability-updating creates a false dichotomy; they're continuous aspects of the same epistemic process.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Reasons Against
1 perspective
Reason against
?
1.
Hume questioned why unobserved cases should resemble observed ones—a problem distinct from applying Bayes' rule to update existing credences.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
2.
Bayesian updating presupposes inductive principles are justified; it doesn't address Hume's fundamental skepticism about induction itself.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
3.
The problem of the uniformity of nature, central to Hume's challenge, concerns justifying new inferences, not mechanical probability revision.
?
How convincing is this?
Think about whether this reason is strong or weak
Next step
Based on where you are in your exploration
Strongest counterpoint
Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.