Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness shows that retention and primal impression are structurally distinct intentional acts, not interchangeable phases of a single semantic convention.
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Retention(Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness; central to Derrida's argument in Voice and Phenomenon)
Husserl's term for the primary memory of the just-past that is folded back into present perception; paradoxically classified by Husserl as both a kind of perception (included in the present) and a kind of non-perception (different from the strict now).
Semantic convention(as used in philosophy of language)
The shared, agreed-upon meanings of words and language that a community of speakers understands and follows.
Structurally distinct(as used in comparing philosophical problems)
Fundamentally different in how they're organized or set up, even if they might seem similar on the surface.
time-consciousness(Zen critique of subject-object epistemology)
A mode of consciousness in which the distance and opposition between subject and object occur temporally, such that the object appears 'in here' as an immanent object in the field of consciousness