Husserl's phenomenological analysis shows that retention is not mere memory but a constitutive feature of the living present itself, making any purely extensional decomposition phenomenologically inadequate.
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The felt, experienced 'now' that you're actually living through, rather than just a single frozen point in time.
Phenomenological analysis(as the method Husserl used to study time)
A careful study of how things actually appear to us in our experience, rather than trying to figure out what's 'really' there behind the scenes.
Phenomenologically inadequate(as Husserl's judgment on purely breaking down the present into pieces)
Fails to capture how things actually appear and feel to our conscious awareness, even if it might seem correct in other ways.
Retention(Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness; central to Derrida's argument in Voice and Phenomenon)
Husserl's term for the primary memory of the just-past that is folded back into present perception; paradoxically classified by Husserl as both a kind of perception (included in the present) and a kind of non-perception (different from the strict now).