Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Hyperintensional explanatory connections may exist in the... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Hyperintensional explanatory connections may exist in the world, not merely in our explanatory practices.

    Causation
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If the correctness of explanations depends on how the world is, rather than only on what suits our explanatory practices, then explanatory asymmetries reflect worldly structure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Cases of hyperintensional explanation (e.g., ~~A explained by A but not vice versa) suggest such dependence on how the world is.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Explanatory asymmetries (e.g., ~~A explained by A) are fully accounted for by cognitive salience and inferential norms, requiring no worldly hyperintensional structure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Positing mind-independent hyperintensional connections violates parsimony: Ockham's razor favors epistemic explanations over inflating ontology beyond extensional facts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism establishes that explanatory virtues are pragmatic and interest-relative, not trackers of observer-independent metaphysical structure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Grounding-theoretic accounts (Rosen, Fine) that posit worldly hyperintensional structure face the Bennett-Wilson objection: grounding relations themselves resist non-circular metaphysical explanation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the regress of 'what grounds the grounding relation' cannot be stopped without brute posit, then hyperintensional explanatory structure earns no ontological advantage over deflationary alternatives.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityCausation

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Cases of hyperintensional explanation (e.g., ~~A explained by A but not vice ver...Explanatory asymmetries (e.g., ~~A explained by A) are fully accounted for by co...Grounding-theoretic accounts (Rosen, Fine) that posit worldly hyperintensional s...If the correctness of explanations depends on how the world is, rather than only...
    +3 moreShow less
    If the regress of 'what grounds the grounding relation' cannot be stopped withou...Positing mind-independent hyperintensional connections violates parsimony: Ockha...Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism establishes that explanatory virtues are ...

    Similar

    Two relations can play the same explanatory role without resembling ea...77%Hume locates the source of the idea of necessary connection not even i...74%Relations of similarity between two particulars cannot be self-explana...74%Hume locates the source of the idea of necessary connection in us, not...74%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: hyperintensionality
    View source passageHide passage
    Explanation is plausibly hyperintensional: “explains” can be flanked by expressions that cannot be substituted with necessary equivalents salva veritate. One pure mathematical truth can explain another, but not every mathematical truth explains every other, even if every pure mathematical truth is a necessary truth (Baron, Colyvan, & Ripley 2020). Schneider (2011) argues that sometimes logical equivalents can explain each other, making a case that “because” is hyperintensional. \({\sim}{\sim
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit