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    I can represent the identity of the apperceiving subject ... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    I can represent the identity of the apperceiving subject indirectly by apprehending a unity or ordering among my representations

    Consciousness & MindPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If the representations I can attribute to myself possess a unity of the right kind, then apprehending that unity allows me to represent the apperceiving subject of any one of them as identical with that of any other
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    • 2.I can be cognitively sensitive to features of my representations, including their unity or ordering
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Unity among representations could be produced by associative mechanisms requiring no persisting subject, as Hume's bundle theory demonstrates.
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    • 2.Inferring a identical subject from representational unity commits the fallacy Kant himself identifies: treating a logical unity as a substantial self.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Representational unity is a relational property of mental states, not a mark of the subject who bears them, leaving the subject's identity underdetermined.
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    • 2.Parfit's reductionism shows that what matters in personal identity can be fully specified by psychological continuity relations without positing a unified apperceiving subject at all.
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    I can be cognitively sensitive to features of my representations, including thei...If the representations I can attribute to myself possess a unity of the right ki...Inferring a identical subject from representational unity commits the fallacy Ka...Parfit's reductionism shows that what matters in personal identity can be fully ...
    +2 moreShow less
    Representational unity is a relational property of mental states, not a mark of ...Unity among representations could be produced by associative mechanisms requirin...

    Similar

    If the representations I can attribute to myself possess a unity of th...86%To represent the identity of the subject of different self-attribution...86%Synthesis must be invoked to account for the unity among representatio...84%Inner sense cannot explain how I represent the identity of the apperce...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kant-transcendental
    View source passageHide passage
    The second stage of the argument of §16 highlights another implication of the claim that “the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject” (B133): that Hume’s theory lacks the resources to account for my representation-relation to the identity of the subject; that is, this view cannot explain how I can “represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations” (B133)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit