If A-properties in Petrie's world are defined by their relational or holistic features, weak supervenience's indiscernibility condition cannot be violated without also violating global supervenience.
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(Modal supervenience relations in philosophy of mind and metaphysics)
A globally supervenes on B if and only if no two possible worlds share the same global pattern of distribution of B-properties while differing in their global pattern of distribution of A-properties.
relational features(contrasted with intrinsic, standalone properties)
Characteristics that only make sense in relation to other things—like being 'taller than' or 'next to.'
weak supervenience(Violated by world w1 in Petrie's example)
A supervenience relation where, within a single world, no two individuals can differ in A-properties without differing in B-properties