If all genuine predication reduces to singular terms referring to particulars, no redefinition of predication kinds is required—only elimination of spurious metaphysical categories.

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Genuine predication(what Sellars is concerned with establishing): Real, meaningful talk about properties that actually matters—not just words we use without a solid connection to how the world actually works.
Spurious metaphysical categories(as used in this philosophical statement): Types of things philosophers think we've mistakenly believed exist in reality, but which are actually fake or unnecessary ideas that we should get rid of.
metaphysical categories(as used in ontology and philosophy of reality): Fundamental types or kinds of things that exist in reality, as opposed to just different ways of talking about things.
particulars(Buddhist epistemology (pramāṇa theory)): The actual objects of the world that are directly accessible only through perception and are ineffable — they cannot be captured or referred to by words

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