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    If an agent F-ed for the purpose of G-ing, then in F-ing ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Purposive explanations of actions are constitutive and not causal in character.

    If an agent F-ed for the purpose of G-ing, then in F-ing the agent was thereby trying to G.

    CausationMoral Responsibility
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    Moral ResponsibilityCausation

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    Because the F-ing and the trying to G are identical or overlapping (not wholly d...Hume's maxim holds that if an event E causes an event E′, then E and E′ must be ...If an agent F-ed for the purpose of G-ing, then the act of F-ing is identical wi...Offering a purposive explanation of F-ing in terms of trying to G is, in effect,...
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    Purposive explanations of actions are constitutive and not causal in character.

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    If an agent F-ed for the purpose of G-ing, then the act of F-ing is id...90%An agent F'ed at a given time because, at that time, the agent had a d...80%If the agent succeeds in φing through skill and not accident, then the...80%When an agent acts for a reason, he acts motivated by an end he desire...79%

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    In a recent article, Brian McLaughlin (2012) agrees that reason explanations are teleological, explaining an action in terms of a purpose, goal or aim for which it was performed. He also agrees that these purposive explanations are not species of causal explanation. However, he rejects the view that these same explanations are grounded on claims about the agent's intentions in acting, and he thereby sets aside the issues, sketched above, about purpose, intention, and their role in rationalizati

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