If an argument for skepticism about intuitions would also justify skepticism regarding perceptual, memorial, or introspective belief, it shows nothing distinctively problematic about intuitions or beliefs based upon them.
(Chudnoff's account of intuitions as the basis of a priori justification)
Intellectual perceptions that sometimes reveal abstract reality, possessing a presentational phenomenology that can be evoked through imagination, reflection, or reasoning
memorial belief(as used in epistemology)
Something you believe based on your memory of past events or facts.
perceptual belief(Sellars's two-element view of perception)
A belief or belief-like state about what is perceived, which in some cases does not accept appearances at face value.
skepticism(Distinguished from relativism as understood in modern philosophy)
The position that we must suspend judgment about the nature of objects
Third, a successful argument for selective skepticism regarding intuitions must be one which does not equally apply to many other sources of putatively justified belief. After all, if the argument at issue would also justify skepticism regarding perceptual belief and/or memorial and/or introspective belief, it shows nothing distinctively problematic about intuitions or beliefs based upon them. Call this constraint on a successful argument, “the local skepticism constraint.”